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The Effect of Corporate Governance Regulations on 
Firm Value: New Zealand Evidence 
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This paper examines the effect that compliance with corporate 
governance regulations has on the value of New Zealand firms. 
Research Findings/Insights: From a sample of 70 New Zealand firms over the period 2000 
to 2007, we find that firms that have a high level of compliance with corporate governance 
regulations have higher value to investors. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Consistent with agency theory, this paper documents 
that voluntary compliance with corporate governance regulations and/or guidelines increases 
the effective monitoring of firm performance. Agency costs associated with the control of 
managerial discretion are mitigated as a result of this voluntary compliance. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study will be of interest to those who set regulations 
and/or guidelines that aim to promote good corporate governance practice. 
 
Keywords: ‘Comply or Explain’ Regulation, Corporate Governance, Discretionary Accruals, 
Tobin’s Q, Enterprise Value. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper contributes to the corporate governance and firm value literature by documenting 
the association among corporate governance regulation, managerial discretion and firm 
valuation in New Zealand. Firm value can be defined as an economic measure that reflects the 
market value of the whole business. It is the aggregate claims of the debt holders, preference 
stockholders, and common stockholders. Firm value is also a performance measure that 
compares book and market value. Understanding the effect of corporate governance 
regulations is important because it effects, inter alia, the opportunistic behaviour of 
management as well as the decision-making process used by investors. Further, it is posited 
that investors would prefer a regulated environment because it offers some level of protection 
to their investments. Prior literature suggests that corporate governance does have a positive 
impact on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), and the 
price-to-book ratio. 
A consequence of the corporate collapses that occurred in the late 20th and the early 21st 
centuries is that legal forms of corporate governance, and regulations that can be characterised 
as a ‘comply or explain’ type of regulation  are commonly found in many countries, The short 
term and long term affects of these corporate governance ‘codes’ is not clear, and this paper 
provides evidence that these types of corporate governance regulations will reduce 
discretionary actions by management in the short term and will maximise firm value in the 
long term. 
Using a sample of seventy companies that were listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) over the period 2001 to 2007, this study finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that firms that have a high level of compliance with corporate governance regulations have 
higher value to investors, i.e. a higher firm value.  
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Corporate governance is measured based on the ‘Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 
2003’, the ‘Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004’ and the ‘Companies 
Act 1993’ indicates better monitoring and internal control systems (Corporate Governance 
Best Practice Code, 2003; Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines," 
2004). One stream of research on corporate governance suggests that governance mechanisms 
reduce managerial discretionary accruals. Another stream of research documents that 
implementing corporate governance guidelines/rules leads to an increase in firm performance. 
This paper employs three different measures of firm value, (Tobin’s Q, Market-to-Book ratio 
and Enterprise Value), and four different discretionary accruals models (Jones model, 
Modified Jones model, Performance Matched model, and Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow model) to establish the effect on firm value.  
This remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section two explores the literature on 
corporate governance and firm value; section three explains the hypotheses and their 
development; section four explains the research methodology; section five analyses the 
results; section six provides the conclusions and concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review 
The classic argument of agency theory is that the separation of owners and managers leads to 
information asymmetry between the parties. To control opportunistic behaviour by managers, 
several external control mechanisms are available, such as externally imposed regulations and 
the appointment of independent directors. Regulatory agencies impose regulations to mitigate 
the agency problem, but voluntary mechanisms as typified by the ‘comply or explain’ nature 
of corporate governance practices may not be as effective as mandatory regulations. 
Following this argument, the literature reveals evidence that weak or voluntary regulations 
may not be sufficiently strong to protect the investment made by, and achieve the objectives 
of, investors (Farrar, 2005). However, investor protection is reduced in the absence of any 
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form of regulatory control irrespective to the nature of regulation. Fasterling (2005) argues 
that investor confidence will also increase when the stock market is regulated, even when 
compliance with those regulations is voluntary as compared to mandatory. The ‘comply or 
explain’ nature of voluntary regulation creates an implicit competition among companies to 
attract investors in their stock. Companies can convey a positive signal to the public if 
investors are aware that they have adopted a recognised code of practice regarding corporate 
governance (Fasterling, 2005). Therefore, better compliance with a code of corporate 
governance leads to better terms for the investor (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007) which in 
turn, leads to an environment where investors are willing to pay more than market price for 
stock in order to achieve a lower risk on investment. However, the literature of corporate 
governance and firm valuation in respect of voluntary regulation is inconclusive (Anderson & 
Gupta, 2009). 
The regulatory system of an economy has a strong influence on the corporate governance 
system. A regulated environment ensures relatively more protection for investors (LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), and firms that operate in better legal regimes 
rely more on external financing to fund their growth (LaPorta, Florencio, Andrei, & Robert, 
1997). Investor protection encourages the development of financial markets since  protected 
investors pay more for securities thereby increasing the attractiveness of securities as an 
investment (LaPorta et al., 2000). LaPorta et al. (1997) show that countries with protected 
shareholders have more valuable stock market. Both “insider” shareholders, i.e. minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000), have significant power with 
respect to the control mechanisms within the firm. However, the effect of voluntary 
regulation, especially a ‘comply or explain’ corporate governance code, arguably leads to 
better monitoring of management. It is well established that state laws of corporate 
governance affect firm value(Gompers et al., 2003). 
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Black, Jang and Kim (2006) prepared a corporate governance index using 515 Korean 
companies based on a 2001 Korean Stock Exchange survey. They categorised their corporate 
governance index using five different dimensions and  by using ordinary least squares 
regression analysis, found 47% prediction of corporate governance indices with Tobin’s Q as 
a proxy of firm value and about 160% increase in share price. Gompers et al. (2003) 
constructed a ‘Governance Index’ using 24 corporate governance rules as a proxy of 
shareholders rights for a sample of 1500 large firms. They found that firms in the highest 
decile of the index with the highest level of managerial power meant weak shareholder rights 
– these were categorised as being in the ‘Dictatorship Portfolio’. Similarly, the strongest 
shareholder rights were observed to be in firms at the lower deciles of their index – these were 
categorised as being in the ‘Democracy Portfolio’.  
Firm performance or firm value (Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003) is one of the major 
research stream in regulation of corporate governance and consequences. Black et al. (2006) 
focused on few dimension of those consequences. First, high value firms tend to adopt good 
governance practices as compared to low value firms. Second, firms may endogenously 
choose different governance practices. Third, firms may adopt good governance rules to 
signal that the firm’s insiders will behave, but it is the signal, not the governance practices, 
that affects share prices. Finally, they concerned with omitted variable bias as economic 
variable may ignore and come in wrong conclusion of corporate governance effects on firm’s 
value. 
Firms operating for long signalling business stability and moderate governance practice. 
Development process of firm improved during the process of operation and firm understood 
their own strength and weakness (Jovanovic, 1982). However, matured firms have more 
spread of operation and complexity which increase agency costs. Younger firm have fast 
growing potentiality rather than older firm (Black et al., 2006). The listing status of firm, 
which indicates managerial confidence about the future prospects for the firm, also indicates 
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better monitoring on behalf of shareholders, which is reflected in the stock price. (Sanger & 
McConnell, 1986). However, a relatively new firm may not have the same impact on 
investors. Black et al., (2006) evidenced a negative coefficient because younger firms are 
likely to be fast growing and be intangible asset-intensive.  
Regulation and investor protection have been shown to have a positive relationship by many 
research studies (Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; LaPorta et al., 1997; LaPorta et al., 
2000). Strong regulations concerning corporate governance tend to result in greater 
compliance practices by firms. A ‘one size fit all’ approach to regulation may not suit all the 
firms in the economy and as the variation increases the legal environment gets less investor 
friendly (Durnev & Kim, 2005). Consistent with previous research, Durven and Kim (2005) 
found a positive statistical relationship with governance and disclosure practices related to 
growth opportunities. Growth firm needs more external financing and concentration to cash 
flow. Such positive relations are stronger in countries with weak legal framework. Moreover, 
they argue that good investment opportunities provide more incentives to improve governance 
practices among firms in countries with a weak legal environment, and finally, the quality of 
governance and disclosure practices are positively related to firm valuation and this 
relationship is weaker in a strong legal environment. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
The question “does good corporate governance practice affect the value of a firm” reflects the 
consequence of effective corporate governance. In two earlier essays (Black et al., 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2003), we posit that corporate governance practice was not the only 
contribution of having regulations. In order to exist, companies must have a minimum level of 
governance in place, but having regulations provides a safer environment for investors. 
Following major corporate collapses in late 20th and early 21st centuries, many countries have 
introduced or enhanced existing regulations and/or guidelines concerning corporate 
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governance. These will not prevent corporate collapses from occurring in the future, but they 
should provide a more secure capital market as a result of better systems of corporate 
governance. Prior studies such as (Durnev & Kim, 2005; LaPorta et al., 2000) provide 
evidence that an effective system of corporate governance is positively related to investor 
protection.  
A significant number of empirical studies have focused on  understanding the relationship 
between corporate governance and ownership concentration (Davies, Hiller, & McColgan, 
2005), board of director independence (Orr, Emanuel, & Wong, 2005), the effectiveness of 
various board committees, and managerial compensation. The results of these studies have not 
been  conclusive because of differences between countries due to different economic 
conditions and differing legal environments (Maher & Anderson, 1999). Recent studies have 
also focussed on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. See, 
for example,  (Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003). 
Agency theory posits that managers are motivated to perform better in order to enhance their 
own position, usually by way of compensation or bonus plans that are based on reported 
accounting numbers. It is therefore logical to argue that managers may use discretionary 
accounting policies to manage their earnings in order to meet targeted net income (or some 
other target) that acts as a threshold to gaining enhanced remuneration. In a competitive and 
well-structured capital market, investors are well aware that this may be happening, and 
therefore will factor this into stock market prices (Cornell & Landsman, 2003). We can 
therefore conclude that stock market prices will be affected when investors are provided with 
information about discretionary policies used by management. 
Previous literature documents that strong and effective systems of internal control will 
enhance firm value. Chhachharia and Grinstein (2007) demonstrate that corporate governance 
does have an economic impact on the firm, and conclude, interestingly, that firms that are less 
compliant with the rules have greater firm value as compared to more compliant firms. 
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Moreover, they found that board independence and internal control have no effect on small 
firms but they do for large firms because they experience greater benefits if they comply with 
the rules. To mitigate the agency problem previously discussed, firms can introduce more 
effective monitoring of management by having outside directors on the board (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Independent boards have more monitoring power as compared to boards that 
are dominated by ‘insiders’. Outside directors are also likely to enrich the board because they 
may come from diverse backgrounds and bring different experiences to the boardroom.  Orr 
et al. (2005) shows that the proportion of outsider directors for high growth  firms is 
positively related to firm value. They included tenure of director, directors’ equity ownership, 
outside involvement of directors and proportion of non-executive directors as attributes in 
their study. 
The above discussion suggests that firms with a high proportion of independent directors, 
appropriate monitoring committees and efficient external auditors will have an effective 
system of monitoring managerial activity. A high level of monitoring reduces opportunistic 
behaviour of managers and provides greater confidence to investors, which, in turn, has a 
positive effect on the value of the firm. Hence, the hypothesis that we test is as follows: 
H0: Companies that comply with corporate governance regulations have greater value than 
those that don’t. 
4. Research Methodology 
The sample of this study is selected from companies listed in New Zealand Stock Exchange 
Limited (NZX). New Zealand Stock Market (NZSE) is the main board of NZX where the 
premium equities are traded. Companies listed on the New Zealand Alternative Market 
(NZAX) were also included in this study. Specific feature of NZAX market is that companies 
are typically new, are experiencing rapid growth, and are able to issue shares for low cost. 
The sample period covers the years 2000 to 2007 inclusive.  By the end of 2007 a total of 153 
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companies were listed by NZX. Companies that were not operating over the entire sample 
period were excluded as were 29 companies that operated in the financial sector since these 
are subject to specific regulations and reporting procedures. Thirty five companies did not 
provide a complete set of financial reports, and the financial information for 19 companies 
was not available.  
The final sample of 70 companies can be classified into sectors using the NZX categories, as 
follows: 
Table – 1 
 
4.1. Measuring Dependent Variables 
To investigate the effect of corporate governance regulation compliance and firm value, the 
following equation (equation 1) is used. Ordinary least squares regression is used for analysis 
based on balanced panel data which pools the observation cross sectional and overall effect. 
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Where, 
FV= Firm Value (measured in Tobin’s Q, Price to Book ration and Enterprise Value) 
REGDUMM = Regulation dummy of 1 for corporate governance regulation otherwise 0; 
CGI = Corporate Governance Index (comprehensive corporate governance indicator with 20 different items 
categorized under Board Composition, Board Committee, Auditing and Managerial Ownership & Dual Listing; 
DAC = Discretionary Accruals of Net Income Measured with Jones Model (1991), Modified Jones Model 
(1995), Performance Matched Model (2005) and Performance based Free Cash Flow model; 
CNTLSHR = Control Shareholding (Single shareholders holding more than 50% share are coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise; 
NZXLISTTEN = New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Tenure; 
OPERTEN = Operating tenure of firm; 
SIZE = Total Assets as a proxy of business size; 
LEVERAGE = Company leverage; 
ROA = Return on Assets; 
SECTDUMM = Sector Dummy; 
.φ  = Error term. 
Firm value can be defined as the economic value of firm which the market forces are ready to 
pay. Previous literature suggests different measures of firm value, with Tobin’s Q and the 
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market price-to-book ratio being the most common. Theoretically, enterprise value (EV) is 
also a strong measure of firm value, and this has been considered in this study as well. The 
following sections discuss these three measures. 
Tobin’s Q: 
The first definition of Firm Value (FV) in this research is as indicated by Tobin’s Q formula. 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) argue that this formula provides a strong  prediction of the  
replacement value of the firm. Tobin’s Q is based on the hypothesis that the combined market 
value of all the companies on the stock market should be equivalent to their replacement 
costs. It compares total outstanding equity and debt in market value and total assets at book 
value. Tobin’s ratio less than 1 indicates that stock is undervalued, and in this situation firms 
have little incentive to invest because the value of new capital investment falls below its costs. 
Conversely, a Tobin Q ratio more than 1 indicates that stock is overvalued and firms would 
have a strong incentive to invest because the value of new capital investment would exceed 
costs. Noteworthy research was conducted based on Tobin’s Q to predict firm value and 
found a significant relationship between corporate governance regulation and firm value 
(Black et al., 2006; Garay & Gonzalez, 2008). Tobin’s Q is calculated as follows: 
TA
TDPSCSsQTobin ++='  
Where, CS = Common Stock at market value; 
PS = Preferred stock at market value; 
TD = Total Debt 
TA = Total Assets at book value  
 
Price-to-Book ratio (P-B ratio): 
The second definition of Firm Value (FV) which is considered relevant to the objectives of 
this study is the price-to-book ratio (P-B ratio) which compares book value of the firm with 
the market value. A higher P-B ratio indicates that investors expect management to create 
more value from a given set of business assets. However, a low P/B ratio may also indicate a 
good investment opportunity. The P-B ratio may become meaningless for high tech 
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companies because most of the assets are hidden (intangible) in these types of firms. Some 
prior research has used the P-B ratio as a measure of firm value (Garay & Gonzalez, 2008; 
Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005). The formula for this ratio is: 
Equity
PSCSratioBookice +=−Pr  
Where, CS = Common Stock at market value; 
PS = Preferred stock at market value; 
 
Enterprise Value: 
The third definition of firm value used in this study is Enterprise Value (EV). Theoretically, 
enterprise value is more representative than other measures of firm value because it provides a 
much more accurate estimate of the value of the firm since it is based on a takeover value. 
Enterprise Value is calculated as follows: 
Enterprise Value = (Market Value of Equity + Market Value of Debt – Cash Holding) 
Enterprise values are collected from DataStream (item no # 307). This study investigates the 
effect that corporate governance regulation has on enterprise value. 
Considering the three different variables that measure firm value, the following models are 
used to satisfy the objectives of this research. 
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Where, 
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REGDUMM = Regulation dummy of 1 for corporate governance regulation otherwise 0; 
CGI = Corporate Governance Index (comprehensive corporate governance indicator with 20 different items 
categorized under Board Composition, Board Committee, Auditing and Managerial Ownership & Dual Listing; 
DAC = Discretionary Accruals of Net Income Measured with Jones Model (1991), Modified Jones Model 
(1995), Performance Matched Model (2005) and Performance based Free Cash Flow model; 
CNTLSHR = Control Shareholding (Single shareholders holding more than 50% share are coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise; 
NZXLISTTEN = New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Tenure; 
OPERTEN = Operating tenure of firm; 
SIZE = Total Assets as a proxy of business size; 
LEVERAGE = Company leverage; 
ROA = Return on Assets; 
SECTDUMM = Sector Dummy; 
.φ  = Error term. 
4.2. Measuring Independent Variables 
To measure the effect of firm value following independent variables also considered. 
4.2.1 Corporate Governance Index 
 A corporate governance index was prepared based on Corporate Governance Best Practice 
Code-2003, Principle and Guidelines of Corporate Governance, Company Act 1993 and the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing rules. The Total Index was divided into 4 sections with 
individual components as follows: 
Board of Director Score (BoDS): 
1. Number of directors on the board: The median number of directors on the boards of 
all the companies sampled over the period of the study was calculated to be six and the 
size of the board for each company was compared to this median. This variable was 
assigned the value of 1 if the number of directors exceeded the median; otherwise the 
value is 0.  
2. Independent director in the board: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate 
Governance suggest that the board should have an appropriate balance of executive 
and non-executive directors. Moreover, the NZX listing rules and Code of Practice for 
Directors (IODNZ, 2009) suggested that majority of directors should be independent 
and there should be at least two independent non-executive directors. The median 
proportion of independent directors on the board for all companies in the sample was 
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calculated to be 0.60. The proportion of independent directors for each company was 
compared to the median, and this variable was assigned a value of 1 if the proportion 
of independent directors on the board was greater than the median; otherwise the value 
is 0. 
3. Board of Director Tenure: Board of director tenure indicate the combined directorship 
of all the board members. Recent business environment becoming more complex and 
top managerial tenure effect on firm performance (Canavan, Jones, & Potter, 2004). 
Newly appointed manager needs time to adjust with different operating environment 
and set up strategy aligning with existing goals. So, directors who operating in the 
same firm for long creates a better coordination in job. Corporate governance 
regulation mentioned about re-appointment of director but did not specified directors’ 
tenure in the board. The appropriate board tenure was compared to median year value 
(31 years) of directorship in the firm and the variable was assigned a value of 1 if 
combined year of all director exceed median, otherwise the value is 0.  
4. Busy Board: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004 suggest that the 
board should allocate time and resources to encourage directors to acquire and retain a 
sound understanding of their responsibilities. Board members who hold directorship in 
other firms have less devoted time to particular entity. Corporate governance 
regulations are silent about specific number of directorship for one individual. Board 
‘busyness’ was measured for all the companies in the sample was calculated to be 24. 
Total directorship of the board to outside for each company was compared to median 
and the variable was assigned 0 if the total directorship to outside is greater then 
median and otherwise the value is 1. 
5. Board Meeting: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004 states that 
the board should allocate time and resources to understanding their responsibilities 
and the implementation of monitoring activities. Corporate governance regulation is 
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silent to specify the frequency of meetings. Board meeting frequency was measured 
for all the companies in the sample were calculated to be 8. Board meeting frequency 
of companies was compared to median and the variable was assigned 1 if the board 
meeting frequency exceed median and otherwise the value is 0 
6. CEO Duality: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004, the NZX 
listing rules, and Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 all state that one 
person should not concurrently hold the position of Chief Executive Officer and be the 
Chair of the board. This variable was assigned a value of 1 if the CEO was NOT the 
chair of the board, and 0 if both roles were vested in the same person. 
7. CEO experience: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004 and Code 
of Practice for Directors in New Zealand emphasise on importance of CEO for 
enhancing business performance and monitoring. Change of CEO impact on firm 
strategy and performance. The effect of CEO was not measurable in short term 
business operation. Median was calculated (3 years) to measure the effects of CEO 
experience for all companies in the sample. The CEO experience variable was 
assigned 1 if the firm have more than median year, otherwise the value is 0.  
Board Committee Score (BCS): 
 
1. Number of Board Committees: The Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 
and the NZX listing rules suggest that there should be sub-committees to deal with 
matters such as Audit, Remuneration and Nominations to senior positions. Companies 
having all three committees are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. 
2. Audit Committee Size: The NZX listing rules and the Principles and Guidelines of 
Corporate Governance 2004 emphasize the necessity to have an audit committee. That 
committee must be of such a size to allow it to function effectively and efficiently. 
The median size of the audit committee was determined for all companies in the 
sample and the size of the audit committee for each company was compared to the 
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median so calculated. This variable was assigned a value of 1 if the size of the 
committee was greater than the median; otherwise the value is 0. 
3. Audit Committee financial expertise: NZX listing rules and the Corporate 
Governance in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines 2004 specify that at least one 
member of the audit committee should have financial expertise. This variable is coded 
1 if the company meets this minimum criterion; otherwise the value is 0. 
4. Audit Committee Meeting: The NZX listing rules and the Corporate Governance in 
New Zealand Principles and Guidelines 2004 emphasize the need to have an effective 
audit committee. According to previous research, the frequency of audit committee 
meetings is an indicator of the effectiveness of audit committee activities (DeAngelo, 
1981). The median frequency of audit committee meetings was determined for all 
companies in the sample and the number of meetings of the audit committee for each 
company was compared to the median so calculated. This variable was assigned a 
value of 1 if the frequency of meeting was greater than the median; otherwise the 
value is 0. 
5. Audit Committee Experience/tenure: Following similar arguments relating to tenure 
and CEO experience, it is posited that a committee made up of people who have 
extensive experience will be more effective in their role as compared to a committee 
that is less experienced. Experience is measured as the number of years served as a 
member of the audit committee, i.e. membership-years. The median total membership-
years for the  current members of the audit committee was determined for all 
companies in the sample and the total number of membership-years for  each company 
was compared to the median so calculated. This variable was assigned a value of 1 if 
the audit committee membership-years were greater than the median; otherwise the 
value is 0. 
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6. Chairman Status of Audit Committee: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand 
Principles and Guidelines 2004 state that one person should not concurrently be the 
Chair of the Board and Chair of the Audit Committee. This variable was assigned a 
value of 1 if the CEO was NOT the chair of the audit committee, and 0 if both roles 
were vested in the same person  
7. Independent director in audit committee: The NZX listing rules, the Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Code 2003, and the Corporate Governance in New Zealand 
Principles and Guidelines 2004, all state that audit committee should be comprised of 
non executive directors and that independent directors should make up the majority of 
the audit committee. The median number of independent directors on the audit 
committee was determined for all companies in the sample and the number of 
independent directors of the audit committee for each company was compared to the 
median so calculated. This variable was assigned a value of 1 if the number of 
independent directors was greater than the median; otherwise the value is 0. 
8. Independent and Executive Director Ratio in Nomination Committee: The 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code 2003 and the NZX listing rules state that 
the majority of the nomination committee should be independent directors. The 
Nomination committee approach is to select directors, both executive and non-
executive, which signals the  market that the board is independent (Bostock, 1995). 
The median number of independent directors on the nomination committee was 
determined for all companies in the sample and the number of independent directors 
of the nomination committee for each company was compared to the median so 
calculated. This variable was assigned a value of 1 if the number of independent 
directors was greater than the median; otherwise the value is 0. 
Audit Score (AS): 
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1. Big 4 Audit firm: The Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles and 
Guidelines 2004 emphasizes the need to have a quality external audit process. It is 
expected that Big 4 audit firms will provide a higher quality audit process and 
independent audit opinion. This variable is coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big 
4 firm; otherwise the value is 0. 
2. Auditor Tenure: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004 specify that 
the same auditor should not be appointed for more than five consecutive years. This 
variable is coded 0 if the company has the same auditor for more than five years; 
otherwise the value is 1. 
3. Audit fee and Non-audit fee ratio: Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 
2004 specify that the board should report annually to the shareholders and 
stakeholders the amount of fees paid to the auditor for audit services and non-audit 
services, separately. Moreover, non-audit work should not be capped to a specific 
proportion of all fees paid to an audit firm. Median value for the ratio of audit fees to 
non-audit fees was determined for all companies in the sample and the ratio for each 
company was compared to the median so calculated. This variable was assigned a 
value of 1 if the ratio was less than the median and 0 otherwise. 
Ownership and Listing Score (OLS): 
 
1. Overseas Listing Status: The NZX listing rules exempt dual listed companies to 
comply with different clause of listing rules. It is assumed that overseas listing impact 
positively the quality of complying with corporate governance. The variable was 
assigned a value of 1 if the company dual listed in that specific year of operation. 
2. Director Shareholdings:  Principles and Guidelines of Corporate Governance 2004  
indicate that small holdings of shares held by the directors indicates that they have no 
other direct or indirect relationship or interest which could reasonably influence the 
judgement of the board or influence their decision making. The median on proportion 
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of director shareholding in compare to total outstanding share of the firm for specific 
year was calculated to be 3.15%. The proportion of director shareholding for each 
companies was compared to the median and the variable was assigned a value of 0 if 
the proportion of director shareholding greater than median, otherwise the value is 1. 
4.2.2   Discretionary Accruals 
The amount of total accruals is the difference between net income and the cash flow from 
operating activities. Total accruals can be divided into discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals arise due to management decisions, and this is 
used as the independent variable in our model. Discretionary accruals were measured based 
on the Jones Model (Jones, 1991), the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 
1995), the Performance Matched Model (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005), and the 
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model (PBFCF model). The total accruals for the 
PBFCF model is the difference between net incomes and free cash flow where free cash flow 
is the sum of cash flow from operating activities and cash flow from investing activities 
(Dechow & Ge, 2006). Discretionary accruals were calculated based on following equations: 
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Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model: 
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Where, TA = Total Accruals; A = Total Assets; ∆REV = Change of Revenues, PPE = Property Plant and 
Equipment, NDA = Non discretionary accruals, ∆REC (or ∆AR) = Change of accounts receivables, ROA = 
Return on Assets, t= time, α = coefficients, β = coefficients. 
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4.2.3 Control Shareholding 
If one entity holds at least half of the issued shares, they are considered to have the control 
shareholding of the company. Clearly if the controlling shareholder owns less than 100% of 
the stick, there must be a minority shareholding. The control shareholder has a dominant 
position on the board and can control board activities, board decisions, and access to 
information. It is expected that there would be a negative relationship between control 
shareholding and firm value. 
4.2.4 Firm Operating Tenure  
The fact that a firm has been operating for a long period of time suggests that the business has 
experienced stability (in relative terms) and growth. New firms tend to be in a ‘high growth’ 
phase whereas older firms tend to have a more stable market capitalization. However, old 
firms also tend to have relatively old management which introduces delays in the decision 
making processes (Faleye, 2007). It is expected that there will be a negative relationship 
between firm operating tenure and firm value. 
4.2.5 NZX Listing Tenure 
NZX listing tenure is the number of years that the firm has been listed on the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange. It is expected that there is a positive relationship between long term listing 
status and investor confidence. 
4.3 Control Variable 
Following previous studies, e.g. (Black et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003) total assets is used 
as a proxy of firm size. It is expected that a large firm will generate more opportunities to 
increase the value of that firm because there are more investment opportunities are easier for a 
large firm as compared to a small firm. Also, a firm with higher leverage will have more 
monitoring by external parties, which should lead to an increase in firm value. Leverage has 
also been considered by previous research (Black et al., 2006) 
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5.  Empirical Results 
As previously stated, the objective of this study is to measure the effectiveness of corporate 
governance regulations in New Zealand. Empirical results are presented in descriptive, 
correlation and regression formats in the following sections. 
5.1. Descriptive Analysis 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and all the independent variables 
except dichotomous variables and sector dummies. The descriptive analysis was conducted on 
the data before transformation. 
Table - 2 
Table-2 shows that minimum 25% of corporate governance code compliance for all the firm 
and maximum 90% of the factor complied. All the discretionary accrual measurement (Jones 
Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance Based Model and Performance Based Free Cash 
Flow Model) have lower discretionary accruals i.e. close to zero. An analysis of skewness and 
kurtosis shows that all the variables are not normally distributed. A method proposed by 
Cooke (1998) is used to normalize the variables, which is based on the approach used by Van 
der Waerden (1952, 1953) . The transformation proposed is achieved by dividing the normal 
distribution into a number of observations plus one segment on the basis that each segment 
has equal probability. We performed the same transformation for all the variables with due to 
non-normality problem. 
Table – 3 
Table 3, shows the descriptive analysis of transformed data. The skewness and kurtosis results 
in Table 2 indicated that the variables were not normally distributed, but Table 3 shows that 
the transformed data is normally distributed which enables more predictable power of 
findings. 
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5.2. Correlation Analysis 
Table 4, shows the correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables. It shows 
that corporate governance index and firm value measurements have a statistically positive 
relationship, indicating that greater compliance with corporate governance codes increases the 
value of the firm. Discretionary accruals value was taken as an absolute value irrespective of 
the actual amount of the accrual, and it shows that there is a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals and firm value. Control shareholding and firm value shows a 
consistently negative relationship, implying that companies with controlling shareholders 
have lower firm value. Regulatory impact on the firm value shows a statistical positive 
relationship, indicating that the firm value increases after the implementation of corporate 
governance codes and supportive regulation. 
5.3. Regression Analysis 
The results of equations 1, 2, and 3 using the measure of all the discretionary accruals are 
presented in Table 5. All the three definitions of firm value are explained in the discretionary 
accruals models tested, namely the Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model, the Performance 
Matched Model and the Free Cash Flow Discretionary Accruals model of discretionary 
accruals. 
 
Table – 5 
 
Table 5 presents the primary multivariate regression analysis to examine the association 
between compliance with corporate governance codes and firm value after controlling for a 
number of possible determinants of such specialization. Three specification and four different 
models under each specification are presented.  
The first specification of firm value is based on Tobin’s Q. Columns 4 to 11 in Table 5 
present the results based on Tobin’s Q. These results reveal that firm value is more for the 
companies that have a high corporate governance index. Specifically, Firms that following 
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precisely corporate governance regulation is generating more firm value. The result is 
statistically significant at 1% level. The regulatory impact of corporate governance affects 
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q, the performance matched model of discretionary 
accruals (statistically significant at the 10% level) and the performance matched free cash 
flow model (statistically significant at the 5% level). However, it should be noted that the 
performance matched free cash flow model of discretionary accruals has a negative effect on 
Tobin’s Q. The interacting coefficient CGI*REGDUMMY*DAC1 (DAC means in general 
Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched 
Free Cash Flow Model)  has a negative effect as expected but it is not statistically significant 
on Tobin’s Q specification of firm value. Our results show that although Tobin’s Q increased 
it is not statistically significant with discretionary accruals and regulation, but corporate 
governance and regulation effects are statistically significant. 
The second specification of firm value, market-to-book ratio, indicates that regulations have a 
positive effect in the performance matched free cash flow model with 5% level of 
significance. The discretionary accruals models also have negative coefficients with market to 
book value ratio but with statistical significance higher than the 10% level. However, the 
corporate governance compliance has a positive coefficient at the 1% level of significance. 
This implies that firms that comply with corporate governance criteria and have better internal 
control systems have a market value higher than the book value of firm. This specification 
also supports the proposition that firm value has a positive relationship with corporate 
governance compliance. 
The third specification of firm value, enterprise value, shows a stronger effect of the variables 
as compared to the Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio models. Regulation has a positive and 
significant effect on firm (enterprise) value except for the performance matched discretionary 
                                                        
1 Interacting variable of Corporate Governance index (CGI), Dummy variable of Regulation (REGDUMMY) 
and Discretionary accruals (DAC) measured by Jones (1991), Modified Jones (1995), Performance Matched 
Model (Kothari et al., 2005) and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model based on Free Cash Flow as 
determinant of Total Accruals. 
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accruals model. The corporate governance index coefficient shows statistically significance at 
the 1% level. This implies that corporate governance compliance leads to greater confidence 
by stakeholders, which leads to an increase in the value of firm. Theoretically, enterprise 
value represents a more accurate value as it considers current market value and total debt of 
firm. Discretionary accruals (Jones, Modified Jones and Performance Matched models) have 
negative effects on enterprise value. This implies managerial discretionary accruals does 
affect firm value. More specifically, firm value will decrease if discretionary accruals 
increase. The Performance Matched Free-Cash-Flow model shows that reducing the 
discretion of net income leads to an increase in market value (coefficient = -1.25, t-statistics -
3.16), and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Enterprise value was found to be much 
lower for controlling shareholder under performance matched free cash flow model with a 1% 
level of significance. This implies firm with control shareholding have less effect of corporate 
governance which ultimately reduces enterprise value. The coefficient of New Zealand Stock 
Exchange listing tenure (NZXLISTEN) is negative and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This implies firm listed for long time in NZX has lower enterprise value than relatively 
recent listed status. This result is consistent with the argument that uncertainty contributes to 
firm value for a young firm (Pastor & Veronesi, 2003). Moreover, it implies that older firms 
who have established bureaucratic processes over business activities tend to lack flexibility 
that enables them to rapidly adjust to changing conditions, which can lead to a reduction in 
market performance as compared to younger firms. (Marshall, 1920). 
All the definitions with discretionary accruals have separate measure of regression. Tobin’s Q 
is consistently showed R2 =28% where as market to book ratio is consistently shows R2 =8% 
but Modified Jones model discretionary accruals shows R2=9%. Finally, enterprise value 
measure of firm value shows the highest R2=36% and consistent value across the models. To 
assess the statistical significance of all the firm value definitions have an F-stat which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 
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6.  Conclusions and remarks 
Corporate governance research is one of the most researched areas in accounting. However, 
very few observable inputs are available to evaluate enterprise value as a proxy of firm value 
based on corporate governance compliance. A sizable body of empirical research has found 
that firm value is determined by corporate governance compliance and certain firm specific 
characteristics. This paper expands this stream of research by incorporating enterprise value 
as a measure of firm value and discretionary accruals calculation using different models as an 
important explanatory variable. Companies are complying corporate governance practice over 
the time for regulatory or voluntary purpose because this compliance enhances better internal 
monitoring system reduces discretionary accruals. Although discretionary accrual has been 
researched from informational asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour aspects, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study to document an association between discretionary 
accruals as a proxy of opportunistic behaviour and firm valuation. This study finds evidence 
consistent with the proposition that corporate governance compliance reduces management 
opportunistic behaviour and results in increased firm value because of significant 
improvements in internal control mechanism due to compliance (Larcker, Richardson, & 
Irem, 2005). This research can be further extended on management incentive with 
performance matched free cash flow model.  
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Appendix: 
 
Table-1: Sector composition of sample 
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Sector Group Companies Observation Percentage 
Energy 8 64 11.43% 
Goods 11 88 15.71% 
Investment 5 40 7.14% 
Primary 9 72 12.86% 
Property 5 40 7.14% 
Service 32 256 45.72% 
Total 70 560 100% 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Tonin's Q 0.07 30.88 1.83 2.49 7.18 70.25 
Market to Book Value -1550.98 97.49 -2.32 72.12 -18.65 387.03 
Enterprise Value -1939.00 96312500.00 2935398.41 12524589.28 5.69 31.99 
Corporate Governance Index 0.25 0.90 0.54 0.12 0.31 -0.51 
Jones Discretionary Accruals 0.00 2.88 0.10 0.19 8.12 98.14 
Modified Jones Discretionary Accruals 0.00 2.92 0.10 0.20 8.31 98.93 
Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals 0.00 1.76 0.09 0.14 6.54 63.13 
Free Cash Flow Discretionary Accruals 0.01 12.24 0.93 1.46 3.54 16.45 
Jones_DAC_CGI_REG 0.00 0.55 0.02 0.05 4.60 31.15 
Modified Jones _DAC_CGi_REG 0.00 0.55 0.02 0.05 4.67 32.07 
Performance Matched DAC_CGI_REG 0.00 0.62 0.02 0.05 5.78 57.48 
Free Cash Flow DAC_CGI_REG 0.00 7.49 0.26 0.64 5.27 40.50 
NZX Listing Tenure 1.00 49.00 14.32 11.92 1.34 0.84 
Operating Tenure 1.00 148.00 30.30 34.35 2.14 3.84 
Total Assets 1541.00 37874000.00 1732828.69 6024749.78 5.23 26.99 
Leverage 0.00 4.57 0.29 0.33 7.31 80.06 
Return On Assets -4.91 3.91 0.07 0.38 -1.58 83.73 
 
Table 3: Transformed Descriptive analysis 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Mkt2BK -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
Tobin_Q -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
EV -2.91 2.79 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.14 
CGI -2.91 2.79 0.00 0.97 0.03 -0.18 
J_DAC_ABS -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
MJ_DAC_ABS -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
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PB_DAC_ABS -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
FCF_DAC_ABS -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
J_DAC_CGI_REG -0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
 MJ_DAC_CGI_REG -0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
PB_DAC_CGI_REG -0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
FCF_DAC_CGI_REG -0.67 2.91 0.06 0.85 0.80 -0.35 
NZX_ListTEN -2.14 2.79 0.00 0.98 0.05 -0.25 
OPER_TEN -2.55 2.79 0.00 0.99 0.01 -0.17 
TOT_ASS -2.91 2.79 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.14 
Leverage -1.93 2.91 0.00 0.98 0.08 -0.31 
ROA -2.91 2.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.13 
  
Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
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                        1 .209** -0.011 .189** .104* .102* -.402** 
-
0.03 
-
0.02
9 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                           0 0.797 0 0.014 0.016 0 
0.47
6 
0.49
8 
Leverage 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                          1 -0.01 .086* -0.016 0.023 -0.079† 
-
0.03
4 
-
0.02
7 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                             0.809 0.042 0.701 0.587 0.061 
0.41
6 
0.51
7 
ROA 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                            1 -.182** .127** .187** -.116** 
.088
* 
0.03
2 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                               0 0.003 0 0.006 
0.03
6 
0.45
2 
Service Dummy 
(Standard) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                              1 -.352** -.330** -.396** 
-
.255
** 
-
.255
** 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                 0 0 0 0 0 
Primary Dummy 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                                1 -.138** -.166** 
-
.107
* 
-
.107
* 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                   0.001 0 
0.01
2 
0.01
2 
Energy Dummy 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                                  1 -.155** 
-
.100
* 
-
.100
* 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                     0 
0.01
8 
0.01
8 
Goods Dummy 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                                    1 
-
.120
** 
-
.120
** 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                       
0.00
5 
0.00
5 
Property Dummy 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                                      1 
-
0.07
7† 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                         
0.06
9 
Investment Dummy 
Pearson 
Correlation 
                                        1 
Sig. (2-
tailed)                                           
 
* Correlation significant at 5% level. 
** Correlation Significant at 1% level. 
† Correlation significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis Results 
Variables Code 
Exp 
Sig
n 
Definition 1: Tobin’s Q Definition 2: Market to Book Ratio Definition 3: Enterprise Value 
Jones Modified Jones 
Performance 
Matched 
Performance 
Matched FCF 
Jones Modified Jones 
Performance 
Matched 
Performance 
Matched FCF 
Jones Modified Jones 
Performance 
Matched 
Performance 
Matched FCF 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept  ? -0.09 -0.79 -0.08 -0.77 -0.10 -0.95 -0.10 -0.99 -0.15 -1.24 -0.15 -1.27 -0.15 -1.21 -0.21 
-
1.78† 
0.10 0.97 0.11 1.11 -0.09 -0.67 -0.04 0.46 
Regulation Dummy 
REGDU
M 
+ 0.28 1.52 0.27 1.49 0.316 1.74† 0.34 1.86† 0.28 1.35 0.28 1.37 0.28 1.38 0.425 2.05* 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.04 -0.13 -0.58 1.94 1.94† 
Corporate Governance Index CGI + 0.21 
4.37*
* 
0.21 
4.38*
* 
0.21 
4.40*
* 
0.20 4.34** 0.24 
4.58*
* 
0.24 
4.61*
* 
0.24 
4.57*
* 
0.248 4.71* 0.48 
11.98
** 
0.48 
11.92
** 
0.48 
11.97
** 
0.49 
12.39
** 
Discretionary Accrual – Jones 
Model 
DAC – J - 0.06 1.22       0.10 1.85† X X X X X X -0.03 -0.75       
Discretionary Accruals – 
Modified Jones Model 
DAC – 
MJ 
-   0.06 1.24     X X 0.11 2.02* X X X X   -0.04 0.97     
Discretionary Accruals – 
Performance Matched Model 
DAC – 
PM 
-     0.03 0.67   X X X X 0.08 1.43 X X     -0.04 -0.87   
Discretionary Accruals – 
Performance Matched FCF 
DAC – 
FCF 
-       -0.30 -0.61 X X X X X X 0.05 0.91       1.37 -1.26 
Interaction of Corporate 
Governance, Regulation and 
Jones Model Discretionary 
Accrual 
REG*CG
I*DAC_J 
- -0.07 -0.63       -0.06 -0.48 X X X X X X 0.07 0.65       
Corporate Governance, 
Regulation and Modified Jones 
Model Discretionary Accrual 
REG*CG
I*DAC_
MJ 
-   -0.07 -0.59     X X -0.07 -0.50 X X X X   0.10 0.84     
Corporate Governance, 
Regulation and Performance 
Matched Model Discretionary 
Accrual 
REG*CG
I*DAC_P
M 
-     -0.10 -0.88   X X X X -0.06 -0.50 X X     0.01 1.24   
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Corporate Governance, 
Regulation and Performance 
Matched FCF Model 
Discretionary Accrual 
REG*CG
I*DAC_F
CF 
-       -0.12 -1.00 X X X X X X -0.17 1.27       -1.25 
-
3.16*
* 
Control Shareholding 
CNTLSH
R 
- -0.06 -0.66 -0.06 -0.66 -0.06 -0.61 -0.06 -0.66 -0.15 -1.50 -0.15 -1.48 -0.15 -1.48 -0.16 1.55 -0.26 
-
3.13*
* 
-0.26 
-
3.13*
* 
-0.27 
-
3.24*
* 
-0.14 
-
3.16*
* 
NZX Listing Tenure 
NXZLIS
TTEN 
- -0.04 -0.79 -0.03 -0.77 -0.03 -0.77 -0.04 -.98 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.24 -0.10 
-
2.56*
* 
-0.10 
-
2.17*
* 
-0.11 -2.56* -0.10 -2.40* 
Business Operating Tenure 
OPERTE
N 
+/- -0.22 
-
4.82*
* 
-0.21 
-
4.83*
* 
-0.22 
-
4.74*
* 
-0.21 
-
4.62** 
0.08 1.60 0.08 1.59 0.08 1.58 0.09 1.68† -0.04 -1.03 -0.04 -1.03 -0.05 -1.08 -0.52 -1.21 
Firm Size 
TOT_AS
S 
+/- -0.23 
-
5.04*
* 
-0.23 
-
5.03*
* 
-0.23 
-
4.98*
* 
-0.23 
-
4.93** 
-0.14 -2.75* -0.14 -2.74* -0.14 
2.76*
* 
-0.15 
-
2.83*
* 
        
Leverage LEV +/- 0.19 
4.85*
* 
0.19 
4.85*
* 
0.20 
4.87*
* 
0.19 4.87** -0.06 -1.37 -0.06 -1.37 -0.06 -1.38 -0.06 -1.37 .0.23 
6.14*
* 
0.23 
-
6.13*
* 
0.23 
6.08*
* 
0.23 
6.09*
* 
Return on Assets ROA - -0.02 -0.48 -0.02 -0.49 -0.2 -0.50 -0.03 -0.79 0.10 2.30* 0.10 2.30* 0.10 2.336 0.09 2.09* -0.01 -0.23 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 -0.33 -0.01 -0.13 
Sector Dummy – Primary  ? -0.64 
-
5.42*
* 
-0.64 
-
5.24*
* 
-0.65 
-
5.53*
* 
-0.67 
-
5.72** 
-0.38 -2.86* -0.36 -2.85* -0.40 -2.97* -0.40 
-
3.01*
* 
-0.20 -0.42* -0.20 
-
1.80† 
-0.20 1.77† -0.17 -1.57 
Sector Dummy – Energy  ? -0.15 -1.18 -0.15 -1.17 -0.16 -1.23 -0.15 -1.20 0.22 1.57 0.23 1.59 0.216 1.52 0.24 1.65† 0.42 0.18 0.41 
3.50*
* 
0.43 
3.61*
* 
0.43 
3.68*
* 
Sector Dummy – Goods  ? 0.48 
3.97*
* 
0.48 
4.00*
* 
0.48 
4.00*
* 
0.47 3.94** 0.28 2.09* 0.29 2.14* 0.278 2.04 0.28 2.06* -0.46 -0.67 -0.47 
-
4.30*
* 
-0.47 
-
4.35*
* 
-0.46 
-
4.26*
* 
Sector Dummy – Property  ? -0.12 -0.80 -0.12 -0.79 -0.13 -0.84 -0.15 -1.03 0.23 1.35 0.23 1.38 0.212 1.25 0.22 1.29 0.01 -0.28 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.22 
Sector Dummy - Investment  ? -0.04 -0.24 -0.04 -0.24 -0.04 -0.25 -0.06 -0.41 0.23 1.34 0.23 1.33 0.219 1.27 0.21 1.22 -0.03 -0.31 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.19 -0.21 -0.21 
Multiple Correlation Coeff. R  0.54 X .054 X 0.54  0.55  0.33 X 0.33 X 0.32 X 0.32 X 0.61 X 0.61 X 0.61 X 0.611 X 
Adjusted R2 R2  .28 X 0.28 X 0.28  0.28  0.08 X 0.09 X 0.08 X 0.08 X 0.354 X 0.356 X 0.36 X 0.36 X 
F-Statistics F-Stat  
15.18
** 
X 
15.19
** 
X 
15.11
** 
 
15.39
** 
 
4.41*
* 
X 
4.48*
* 
X 
4.27*
* 
X 
4.22*
* 
X 
22.85
** 
X 
22.91
** 
X 
22.97
** 
X 23.20 X 
Durbin-Watson Stat.   2.02 X 2.02 X 2.02  2.00  2.04 X 2.04 X 2.03 X 2.02 X 1.86 x 1.85 X 1.85 X 1.85 X 
Observation 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
* Correlation significant at 5% level. 
** Correlation Significant at 1% level. 
† Correlation significant at 10% level 
